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Amy Liang†
The Fair Housing Act is a groundbreaking federal law enacted in 1968 during
the civil rights movement. Reflecting a policy judgment that the public’s interest in
eliminating housing discrimination outweighs a prejudicial landlord’s property
right to exclude, it prohibits landlords from rejecting tenants on a discriminatory
basis. However, as the Act’s promises remain in the process of fulfillment, the
Supreme Court’s 2021 decision in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid has placed it into
unprecedented danger: by holding that a regulation authorizing temporary occupations of private property constituted a per se taking that requires compensation under the Takings Clause, Cedar Point threatens the constitutionality of the Act, which
grants tenants a similar temporary right to access rental properties.
This Comment takes up the task of finding an escape valve for the Act within
the current legal landscape. Looking to Cedar Point’s Court-created exceptions, this
Comment argues that the Act should fall under the “open to the public” exception
because case law, common law considerations, and the normative value in preserving an important antidiscrimination law all support a finding that the Act regulates
the business of offering dwelling rentals, a type of business open to the public.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a well-established tension between an individual’s
rights to property and the interests of the public. A landowner is
generally free to use her property, transfer it to others, dispose of
it, and—most importantly—exclude unwanted strangers from
entering it.1 However, the pursuit of public welfare often compels
state and federal governments to restrict a landowner’s property
rights.2 And they may do so, as long as such restrictions do not
amount to “tak[ings] . . . without just compensation” under the
Fifth Amendment.3
The Fair Housing Act4 (FHA) is one such regulation. It reflects a legislative judgment that the public’s interest is best
served by eliminating discrimination in the housing market.5
Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) prohibits discrimination in the
sale or rental of dwellings on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex,
1
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude II, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER
PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1, 4–7 (2014).
2
See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115–19 (1978)
(describing New York City’s restriction on a private company’s right to build a tower on
its railroad station in response to public concern over the protection of city landmarks).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
4
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619).
5
See Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a
Perspective, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 153 (1969) (noting that arguments for the elimination
of discrimination in housing included increased opportunities for employment and education and positive psychological significance for Black Americans).
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familial status, or national origin.”6 In the rental context, this
provision forbids a landlord harboring negative sentiments
toward minority applicants from refusing to accept them as tenants. Thus far, the question of whether the FHA amounts to an
unconstitutional taking has not been raised in court proceedings.
But the Supreme Court’s 2021 decision in Cedar Point
Nursery v. Hassid7 called the FHA’s constitutionality into question.8 In Cedar Point, the Court was asked to decide whether a
state regulation that permitted union organizers to enter agricultural employers’ property for three hours a day, 120 days a year
amounted to a per se taking.9 Even though this regulation did not
authorize a permanent occupation of private property by the public,10 the Court answered in the affirmative.11 As a consequence,
any regulation that, like the FHA, enables unwanted third parties to temporarily occupy a private property without also providing mechanisms for compensating the private owner is in danger
of becoming an unconstitutional per se taking.
Cedar Point demonstrated the Court’s desire to afford greater
protection to individual property rights. In rendering a decision
favorable to the agricultural employers, the Court extended the
boundary of what constitutes a per se taking in a context where
such a move would protect the rights of powerful land-owning employers over the interests of their less powerful employees.12 This
action seems to conflict with the balance struck by the FHA—
namely, that the interest in combatting housing discrimination,
a type of discrimination that closely relates to the badges and
incidents of slavery,13 is important enough to triumph over an
individual’s property rights.

6

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
8
See Nikolas Bowie, Comments: Antidemocracy, 135 HARV. L. REV. 160, 197–98
(2021) (discussing how Cedar Point threatens to render workplace antidiscrimination and
fair housing laws takings that require just compensation).
9
See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2069.
10 The Supreme Court’s Cedar Point decision is contrary to its prior decisions concerning the Takings Clause, including Loretto, which held that a regulation becomes a per
se taking only if it authorizes a permanent physical occupation of private property. See,
e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434 (noting “the constitutional distinction between a permanent
occupation and a temporary physical invasion” and holding that a “permanent physical
occupation of property” constitutes a taking).
11 See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2072–74.
12 See infra notes 118–121 and accompanying text.
13 Cf. Hugh E. Hackney, Comment, Racial Discrimination and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 23 SW. L.J. 373, 374–75 (1969) (discussing how congressional debates in 1864 and
7
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This Comment examines the expansive scope of Cedar Point’s
definition of per se takings with a focus on its impact on the FHA.
Part I explores the development of the Supreme Court’s takings
jurisprudence and discusses the changes made by Cedar Point.
Notably, although the category of per se takings had always been
narrowly cabined to permanent and physical occupations, Cedar
Point effectively eliminated the permanency factor.
In light of this development, Part II explains how Cedar
Point’s holding threatens the constitutionality of the FHA, a statute that restricts a landlord’s right to exclude strangers from temporarily occupying her property as tenants when that exclusion is
done on a discriminatory basis. Beyond disabling its enforcement,
rendering the FHA a taking would likely slow future equal rights
efforts by creating an entitlement in the right to discriminate.
Accordingly, Part II ends by noting that the Court will likely hesitate to invalidate the FHA given the statute’s social importance
and the Court’s expressed disinclination to render unconstitutional a large swath of regulations.14
In Part III, this Comment recommends that courts confronted with takings challenges to the FHA evaluate dwelling
rentals as “business[es] open to the public.” As Part III.A
explains, Cedar Point excepted four scenarios from becoming per
se takings, including when the statute at issue regulates businesses open to the public. The Court sourced its understanding of
a business open to the public from two locations: publicaccommodation laws and First Amendment doctrine. The First
Amendment–based understanding supports this treatment of the
rental business.
Part III.B expands on this argument. It argues that dwelling
rentals should be considered the same type of business as hotel
keeping, where owners are obligated by the common law innkeeper’s rule to accept guests without discrimination. This
proposal, though it requires a major deviation from the principles
underlying the innkeeper’s rule, would safeguard an important
antidiscrimination law from the danger of becoming an unconstitutional taking. Further, increasing similarities between rental
dwellings and hotels, especially with the rise of short-term rentals, point toward the appropriateness of expanding the
innkeeper’s rule to cover landlords offering rental dwellings.
1965 reflected the belief that certain forms of discrimination, such as the “refusal to sell
real property” to Black people, were “incidents of slavery”).
14 See infra Part II.C.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fifth Amendment states that the government shall not
take private property “for public use, without just compensation.”15 This language, commonly known as the Takings Clause,
recognizes that governmental action may override an individual’s
ownership of, and interests in, her property.16 Courts historically
understood the Takings Clause to govern only eminent domain
proceedings,17 in which the government formally takes possession
and control of specific private properties. In 1922, however, the
Supreme Court held that statutory regulations could also amount
to takings.18
In Parts I.A and I.B, this Comment briefly overviews these
regulatory takings and describes the factors that affect whether
courts consider a regulation to have effected a taking. It then
closely examines a special category of cases where the Court departed from its standard-like regulatory-takings analysis to hold
that the statutes at issue amounted to per se takings of private
property. Part I.C focuses on Cedar Point, a recent addition to the
Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence, and shows that the majority opinion has blurred the distinction between per se and regulatory takings.
A. Regulatory Taking: A Framework Applicable to Most
Property Rights–Related Regulations
Federal and state governments can limit individuals’ property rights via statutory regulations. While these regulations do
not expropriate private property, they may nevertheless place onerous burdens on affected landowners. Recognizing that it is
sometimes unfair to force individual landowners to “bear the burden of an exercise of governmental power in the public interest,”19

15 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1. The Fifth Amendment has been extended to the states
via incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1897).
16 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. L.A. Cnty., 482 U.S. 304, 315
(1987) (noting that the Takings Clause was not designed to “limit the governmental interference with property rights” but to ensure compensation in such events).
17 See Robert D. Rubin, Taking Clause v. Technology: Loretto v. TelePrompter
Manhattan CATV, A Victory for Tradition, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 165, 168–70 (1983).
18 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
19 Daniel R. Hansen, Environmental Regulation and Just Compensation: The National Priorities List as A Taking, 2 N.Y.U. ENV’T. L.J. 1, 6 (1993); Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) (recognizing that governmental regulations could “unfairly
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the Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon20 that
Fifth Amendment takings occur when regulations that restrict
land use “go[ ] too far.”21
The Court clarified when a regulation would go so far as to
constitute a taking by developing a fact-based balancing test in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.22 At issue in
Penn Central was the application of New York City’s Landmarks
Preservation Law23 to the Grand Central Terminal.24 Adopted in
1965, the Landmarks Law aimed to preserve the city’s historical
scenery by requiring private owners of such landmarks to acquire
approval from the Landmarks Preservation Commission before
modifying their exteriors.25 When the Grand Central Terminal’s
owners planned to erect a tall building atop the Terminal and rent
out its spaces to alleviate their dire financial straits, the Commission denied their plan because the building would “overwhelm”
the Terminal’s aesthetics.26 The owners filed suit, alleging that
the construction restrictions resulting from the Landmarks Law
amounted to takings of their property.27
In resolving the dispute, the Court considered three factors
that balance the regulation’s impact on the property owners
against its public benefits.28 The factors are as follows: “The economic impact of the regulation on the [regulated party];” “the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations;” and “the character of the governmental action.”29 Applying these factors to the Penn
Central case, the Court found that the Landmarks Law did not
constitute a taking because (1) it continued to allow the owners to
derive “reasonable returns” from operating the Terminal;30 (2) it
did not upset the owners’ expectations via interfering with “the
present uses of the Terminal;”31 and (3) as for the character of the

single[ ] out [a] property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a
whole”).
20 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
21 Id. at 415.
22 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see id. at 124.
23 NYC Admin. Code, Ch. 3, §§ 25-301–25-322.
24 Id. at 115.
25 See id. at 109–12.
26 Id. at 118.
27 See id. at 119.
28 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 5–6 (1993) (discussing the Penn Central factors).
29 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
30 Id. at 136.
31 Id.
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regulation, it did not single out “selected owners,” nor did it constitute physical appropriation of private property.32
As the Penn Central dissent pointed out, however, the
Landmarks Law deprived the Terminal’s owners of their property
right to construct a building worth “several million dollars” atop
the Terminal.33 In other words, the regulation uniquely “imposed”
a “multimillion dollar loss” onto the owners.34 Consequently, as
the Court recognized in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corporation,35 the Penn Central analysis is not especially landowner-friendly in practice; it has often been used to uphold
“substantial regulation of an owner’s use of his own property . . .
to promote the public interest.”36
B. Per Se Takings: Regulations that Authorize Permanent and
Physical Occupations
In 1982, the Supreme Court departed from its ad hoc regulatory taking analysis in favor of protecting the landowners’ property rights by holding that certain property regulations are so
extreme that they amount to per se takings. The most notable
case that lays out this principle is Loretto.
At issue in Loretto was a New York State statute which required landlords to “permit a cable television company to install
its cable facilities upon [their] property.”37 The statute further forbade the landlords from receiving compensation for the installation beyond what the New York Cable Television Commission
deemed reasonable.38 Pursuant to this statute, the Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corporation installed cables on the roof of the
petitioner’s building.39 The petitioner argued that the statute constituted a per se taking of her property without just compensation.40
32 Id. at 131. Penn Central found that “a ‘taking’ may more readily be found when
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government.”
Id. at 124. It was not until Loretto that the Court “removed permanent physical invasions
from Penn Central’s purview.” Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory
Takings Test, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 601, 621 (2014).
33 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 142 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 147.
35 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
36 Id. at 426.
37 Id. at 421.
38 See id. at 423.
39 See id. at 421–22.
40 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 424–25 (noting that the lower courts rejected the argument
“that a physical occupation authorized by government is necessarily a taking”).
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The statute, by authorizing the cable installation, imposed
only a minor physical burden on the petitioner’s property rights.
The installation took up very little space on the landlord’s roof
and hardly restricted her property use.41 In fact, the Commission
determined that the cable’s invasion was worth just one dollar.42
Additionally, the statute intended to “serve[ ] the legitimate public purpose of ‘rapid development of and maximum penetration by
a means of communication which has important educational and
community aspects.’” 43 Nonetheless, the Court did not subject the
statute to the Penn Central ad hoc regulatory takings analysis
and agreed with the petitioner that the statute amounted to a
taking of her property.44
The Court held that “when the physical intrusion reaches the
extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has
occurred.”45 Loretto emphasized that the per se taking rule narrowly applies to a special category of governmental regulations.
It further clarified that a regulation amounts to a per se taking
only if it authorizes an occupation of private property that is both
physical and permanent.46 The following Sections analyze what
constitutes a physical occupation, and what constitutes a
permanent occupation.
1. Physical occupation.
A physical occupation occurs when uninvited entities enter a
landowner’s property.47 The entities could be objects or members
of the public.48 The size of the invading entity also does not affect
whether its entry is a physical occupation. According to Loretto,
41

See id. at 422.
Id. at 423–24.
43 See id. at 425 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423
N.E. 2d 320, 329 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1981)).
44 See id. at 425–26.
45 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
46 See id. at 426–27, 430.
47 See id. at 427–28 (distinguishing the facts of Loretto from those of Northern
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879), where the construction of a dam prevented landowners from accessing their properties but did not cause anything to enter the
properties).
48 See, e.g., id. at 426 (holding that a cable physically occupied a landlord’s property);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (holding that an imposition of a
navigable servitude on a privately developed marina, requiring the marina’s owners to
allow free public access to its waters, amounted to a per se taking); Nollan v. Calif. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 83 (1987) (finding that a regulation that requires landowners to
make an easement across their land “available to the public on a permanent basis”
amounted to a per se taking).
42
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entities physically occupy property “even if they occupy only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner’s use of the rest of his land.”49
2. Permanent occupation.
Also crucial to Loretto’s decision in favor of the landowner
was the permanent nature of the cable installation. To highlight
the importance of the permanent-versus-temporary distinction in
the per se takings analysis, the Court distinguished “between a
permanent physical occupation, a physical invasion short of an
occupation” and a regulation that does not cause invasions.50
While the latter two are subject to the regulatory takings analysis
discussed previously in Part I.A, the former is a per se taking51
because a landowner “suffers a special kind of injury when a
stranger directly invades and occupies” her property.52
The evaluation of whether an occupation is permanent, according to the Court, relies on three principles. First, courts consider the question of permanency in light of the property’s current
use.53 To illustrate, the statute in Loretto affected only landlords.
If the petitioner were to cease renting her building to tenants, she
would no longer have to keep the cables on her roof. By determining that the cable permanently occupied the petitioner’s property,
the Court clarified that an occupation is permanent as long as the
landowner cannot remove it given her current property use.54
Second, courts ask whether an occupation is both continuous55 and indefinite—in other words, whether it exists for
(1) twenty-four hours a day, (2) day after day, and (3) indefinitely
into the future.56 The cable installation in Loretto exemplifies an

49

Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430.
Id.
51 See id. at 430–32; see also Michael L. Gold, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.: The Propriety of a Per Se Rule in Takings Claims, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
419, 424 (1983).
52 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 (emphasis omitted).
53 Cf. id. at 438–39 (noting that, even though the statute applies only to buildings
for rent and the petitioner is free to alter her property use, these facts do not render the
cable’s invasion temporary).
54 See id. at 439 (“So long as the property remains residential and a CATV company
wishes to retain the installation, the landlord must permit it.”).
55 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832 (discussing the public’s ability to continuously pass
through a public easement over a private property).
56 For example, the lower courts in Cedar Point found that a permanent physical
invasion occurred when a regulation allowed the public “to unpredictably traverse [the
growers’] property 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.” See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2070
50
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occupation that possesses all three features. By being stationary
and unmovable, the cable continuously occupied the petitioner’s
roof. And, because the petitioner could not remove it after a predetermined period—for example, after a year—its stay on her roof
was indefinite.57
Third, in conducting the permanency analysis, courts ask
whether a property owner has lost her right to exclude rather
than whether intruding entities were actually present on her
premises.58 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,59 the
Court considered whether a hypothetical regulation that granted
the public an easement over a private property would constitute
a per se taking.60 In this hypothetical, strangers could travel
across the easement at any time. However, travelers, unlike cables, are unlikely to stay on private property for more than a few
minutes. It is also imaginable, for instance, that no stranger
would use the easement at night.
The Nollan Court concluded that such an easement would
constitute a per se taking. It stated that what truly matters is
that the easement gives strangers “a permanent and continuous
right to pass to and fro” across the property.61 By shifting the analytical focus away from the conduct of the invasive entity, this
principle acknowledges that human beings have a higher level of
mobility than objects. It further emphasizes that regulations that
authorize physical invasion are problematic because they interfere with one of the most fundamental sticks of a person’s bundle
of property rights—the right to exclude.62
C. Cedar Point: A New Understanding of Per Se Takings
The Supreme Court reexamined its takings jurisprudence in
Cedar Point. At issue was a California regulation that required
agricultural employers to allow union organizers onto their premises for up to “three hours per day, 120 days per year” to solicit
(citing Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma, 923 F.3d 524, 532 (2019), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 2063
(2021)).
57 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438–40.
58 Cf. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832 (noting that the important issue is whether other individuals have a “permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro” rather than whether
there’s a particular individual there at any given moment).
59 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
60 See id.
61 Id. at 832 (emphasis added). The Nollan Court considered this scenario in dicta.
However, the opinion expressed certainty that such an easement would be a per se taking.
62 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
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their employees’ support.63 The union organizers could “take access” to an employer’s property by serving written notice on the
employer.64 Further, the temporal scope of the entry was limited.
Union organizers could enter the property for “one hour before
work, one hour during the lunch break, and one hour after
work.”65 An employer interfering with an organizer’s right of access—for example, by blocking the organizer’s entry66—could be
punished for “unfair labor practice[s].”67
Cedar Point Nursery and Fowler Packing Company, two
fruit-growing corporations, challenged this regulation, arguing
that it amounted to a per se taking.68 The district court rejected
their contention because the California regulation did not grant
the “public” a “permanent and continuous” access onto their property “for whatever reason.”69 The Ninth Circuit affirmed that the
regulation did not authorize a permanent physical invasion on
the grounds that “it did not ‘allow random members of the public
to unpredictably traverse the growers’ property 24 hours a day,
365 days a year.’”70
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a governmentauthorized invasion of private property is a per se taking “regardless of [its] length.”71 In addition to rendering the
California regulation an unconstitutional taking, this holding expanded the scope of what may constitute per se takings; previously, only regulations that authorized a physical and permanent
occupation would fall into this category.
The Court altered the definition of per se takings in two ways.
First, it clarified that a regulation authorizes a physical occupation even when it does not grant a right of access to the entire
public. Prior to Cedar Point, Loretto had implied that a statute
would constitute a physical occupation if it authorized specific

63

Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2072.
Id. at 2069.
65 Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8 §§ 20900(e)(3)(A)–(B), (4)(A)).
66 See id. at 2070.
67 Id.
68 See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2069–70.
69 Id. at 2070 (quoting Cedar Point Nursery v. Gould, No. 1:16-cv-00185, 2016
WL 1559271, at *5 (E.D. Cal., Apr. 18, 2016), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021)).
70 Id. (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Cedar Point v.
Shiroma, 923 F.3d at 532).
71 Bethany R. Berger, Eliding Original Understanding in Cedar Point Nursery v.
Hassid, 33 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 307, 312 (2022) (citing Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2074).
64
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objects to enter private property.72 Where intrusions by human
beings were concerned, a statute was considered to cause a physical occupation only when it granted a right of access to anyone
from the public.73 Cedar Point departed from this traditional approach, finding that a regulation that grants a right of access to a
subsection of the public, such as union organizers, can be a
per se taking.
Second and more notably, the Court blurred the distinction
between permanent and temporary occupations.74 Before Cedar
Point, a permanent occupation had to be both continuous and indefinite to rise to the level of a taking. However, the California
regulation satisfied only the indefiniteness factor by virtue of its
lacking a “contemplated end-date.”75 The regulation did not authorize a continuous occupation because the employers were required to allow the union organizers onto their premises for only
three hours per day, 120 days per year. They remained free to
exclude the union organizers, and everyone else from the public,
twenty-one hours per day, 245 days per year.
The blurring of the permanent-versus-temporary distinction
operates in two ways. At the outset, the Court’s holding that a
regulation authorizing a noncontinuous occupation of private
property constituted a per se taking indicates that “continuity”
would no longer factor in the permanency analysis. Further, as
shown below, language in Cedar Point suggests that the Court
has entirely eliminated the permanency requirement from the
definition of per se takings.
The Court justified eliminating the continuity factor by cabining it to the facts presented in two precedents: Nollan and
United States v. Causby.76 Both cases involved the government

72 See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421 (finding that the installation of cables on an
apartment constituted a taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261–62 (1946)
(evaluating whether the low flight of airplanes above private property constituted
a taking).
73 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828 (evaluating a statutory easement to the entire public);
Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 169 (same). The lower courts in Cedar Point further supported
this understanding. See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2070 (noting that “[t]he [appellate] court
agreed with the District Court that the access regulation did not [impose a permanent
physical occupation] . . . because it did not ‘allow random members of the public to unpredictably traverse’” the growers’ property (quoting Cedar Point, 923 F.3d at 532)).
74 See Berger, supra note 71, at 313–14.
75 Cedar Point, 923 F.3d at 532. This fact did not weigh significantly in the Court’s
holding. Cf. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2078–79 (drawing a distinction between trespass
and takings).
76 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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taking an easement across private property. According to the
Court in Cedar Point, the hypothetical easement determined to
be a per se taking in Nollan is “legally continuous” but “hardly
continuous as a practical matter”77 due to its nonconstant usage.
Similarly, the government-created easement for flying military
planes over a private barn’s airspace, which was deemed as a taking in Causby, was used for merely “4% of takeoffs and 7% of landings.”78 Although unimportant in their respective decisions, these
facts were crucial to Cedar Point. Focusing on the intruding entities’ sporadic actual presence on private property—and not the
landowners’ continued inability to exercise their exclusionary
right—the Cedar Point Court made a surprising departure from
its precedents,79 in which continuity had not factored into the
permanent-occupation analysis.80
Cedar Point’s expansion of what constitutes a per se taking
did not stop at altering the permanency analysis. Specifically, the
California regulation authorized an indefinite entry onto employers’ property because it lacked a contemplated end date. The
Court could have redrawn the line between permanent and temporary occupations at whether the challenged occupation is indefinite. It did not do so, however. Stating that “[u]nlike a mere trespass, the regulation grants a formal entitlement to physically
invade the growers’ land,” the Court shifted the focus of the per
se takings analysis from Loretto’s focus on the permanent versus
temporary distinction to the easy question of whether there was
a physical occupation.81 This change suggests that Cedar Point
could validly be read as recharacterizing per se takings as physical—rather than physical and permanent—occupations.
The significance of Cedar Point’s changes to the Court’s takings jurisprudence has been highlighted by several recent

77

Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2075.
Id. (citing Causby, 328 U.S. at 259); see also Causby, 328 U.S. at 258, 264–67.
79 Cedar Point’s conclusion was inconsistent with the legal rationales of the Court’s
prior takings precedents. It departed from Loretto’s careful exception of regulations that
authorize physical and permanent occupations from the Penn Central framework.
Moreover, it disregarded the principle elucidated by Nollan—namely, that courts should
conduct the permanency analysis from the landowner’s perspective by asking whether a
regulation caused her to lose a stick of her property rights, rather than asking whether
the intruding entities actually stayed on her property.
80 See id. at 2075 (“[P]hysical invasions constitute takings even if they are intermittent as opposed to continuous.”); id. (contending that the Nollan Court would have concluded that the easement constituted a per se taking even if the easement “had lasted for
only 364 days per year”).
81 Id. at 2080.
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commentators. For example, Professor Bethany Berger finds that
Cedar Point starkly departed from not only existing precedents
but also early American law concerning the right to enter private
property.82 Placing the case in a broader sociopolitical context,
Professor Christina Rodriguez recognizes Cedar Point as an
example of the Roberts Court’s utilization of “constitutional backstops” to constrain the states’ police power to enact laws that benefit the public welfare.83 The California regulation, after all, was
a state regulation that intended to protect workers by giving them
more access to unionization.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that the Cedar Point
majority would likely not characterize the case as revolutionary.
As Professor Josh Blackman points out, Chief Justice John
Roberts, the author of the majority opinion, “professes to decide
cases in narrow ways, and hesitates to actually overrule precedents.”84 The opinion itself also demonstrates the majority’s desire to fit Cedar Point into the sea of existing case law. For example, despite altering the principles embedded in precedents such
as Causby and Nollan, Cedar Point did so quietly and refused to
admit that its legal conclusions have departed from the past.
Implicit in Cedar Point, then, is the Roberts Court’s reluctance to
take an openly drastic step towards altering its takings jurisprudence. Hence, while Cedar Point has become the new law of the
land, prior case law—those whose logic it did not repudiate—
likely remains relevant in understanding, and perhaps constraining the reach of, its holding.
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Cedar Point’s expansion of what constitutes a per se taking
raises the concern that many “ordinary forms of regulations” have
become unconstitutional takings.85 These regulations, as

82 See Berger, supra note 71, at 314, 331–32; see also Bowie, supra note 8, at 196
(noting that the cases contradict the proposition that the government must pay employers
every time it interferes with their right to exclude).
83 Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Supreme Court 2020 Term: Foreword: Regime Change,
135 HARV. L. REV. 1, 126 (2021); see also Sam Spiegelman & Gregory C. Cisk, Cedar Point:
Lockean Property and the Search for a Lost Liberalism, in CATO S. CT. R.: 2020–21, at
165, 188–89 (Trevor Burrus ed. 2021) (framing Cedar Point as a case that limits the exercise of state police power to confer benefits on individuals).
84 Josh Blackman, Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid Quietly Rewrote Four Decades of
Takings Clause Doctrine, REASON (June 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/ZLU5-2W4V.
85 Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2081 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Bowie, supra
note 8, at 197–98.
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Professor Nikolas Bowie suggests, include “fair housing laws
[that] prohibit landowners from excluding potential renters on
the basis of their race,”86 such as the FHA. The sections below
provide an overview of the FHA provision relevant to the takings
inquiry and explain why that provision will likely be considered
a per se taking post–Cedar Point—a move that would impact both
the FHA’s enforcement and the modern antidiscrimination movement’s continuing progress.
A. The Statute
The FHA, a landmark piece of federal legislation, was passed
as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 196887 amidst fierce congressional debate and explosive public sentiment.88 It was passed
in response to a national climate of “significant racial tension,”
and it aimed to eliminate racial segregation and its associated
harms, including “poverty, lack of education, underemployment,
and discrimination in housing.”89
Section 3604 of the FHA prohibits discrimination against potential buyers and tenants of dwellings, defined in § 3602(b) as
places “occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a
residence.”90 Section 3604(a) specifically makes unlawful a person’s refusal to sell or rent “after the making of a bona fide offer,
or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person” because of
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, familial status, and disability.91 This provision regulates all sales and rentals of dwellings except for what is known as the “Mrs. Murphy” situation—
when a landlord lives in a building with four or fewer units and
rents out the other units.92
The FHA represented a groundbreaking shift in national
housing policy from permitting individual landowners to discriminate as an exercise of their property rights to promoting equality
86

Bowie, supra note 8, at 197.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619.
88 See Dubofsky, supra note 5, at 149–63.
89 Cassia Pangas, Note, Making the Home More Like a Castle: Why Landlords Should
Be Held Liable for Co-tenant Harassment, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 561, 574 (2011) (quoting Aric
Short, Post-Acquisition and the Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 203, 222
(2006)).
90 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b).
91 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
92 See Scott M. Badami, What is the “Mrs. Murphy” Exception to the Fair Housing
Act?, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP (July 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/82HE-UGZC.
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and protecting civil rights. The movement toward housing equality began during the Civil War era and continued with the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,93 which abolished slavery and
involuntary servitude.94 As the 1850s congressional debates suggested—and the Supreme Court later affirmed95—the Thirteenth
Amendment was also intended to abolish badges and incidents of
slavery that “impaired and destroyed the rights of [Black
Americans],” including housing discrimination.96 This view was
later affirmed by the Supreme Court.97
However, early efforts toward fair housing did not protect
against discrimination by private landowners. The Civil Rights
Act of 1866,98 which sought to safeguard Black Americans’ civil
rights, declared that “all citizens should have the same rights ‘to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.’”99 Nonetheless, members of the enacting legislature
emphasized that the Act was intended to protect against only
“state-sanctioned discrimination and not [ ] purely private discrimination.”100 Accordingly, the FHA was the first instance
where members of Congress decided to prohibit private-housing
discrimination.
During the five decades since its passage, the FHA has enabled public and private actors to steadily eliminate housing discrimination.101 It started by proscribing the most blatant type of

93

Hackney, supra note 13, at 378–79.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
95 Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441, 439–41 (1968) (concluding
that the Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to pass legislations to abolish such
badges and incidents of slavery as restraints upon “the same right . . . to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.” (quoting Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883))).
96 Hackney, supra note 13, at 374.
97 See Jones, 392 U.S. at 427.
98 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C).
99 Richard V. Damms, Fair Housing Act, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 254, 255
(Salem Press ed. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1982); Michael Haas, Fair Housing Act, in
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 254, 255 (Salem Press ed. 2000). Notably, the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 is narrower than the FHA because it only prohibits housing discrimination on
the basis of race.
100 Hackney, supra note 13, at 377. In 1968, the Jones Court, contrary to the enacting
legislature’s intent, interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to also apply to private acts
of discrimination. See 392 U.S. at 436 (“[I]t is clear that the Act was designed to do just
what its terms suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination, whether or not under color of
law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein.”)
101 See Katherine M. O’Regan, The Fair Housing Act Today: Current Context and
Challenges at 50, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 704, 705 (2019) (“Although there is considerable
work still to be done . . . discrimination in housing markets has declined.”).
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discrimination, where a landlord makes clear her intention to
select tenants on the basis of race and other protected classes.102
It further addressed enforcement deficiencies by empowering the
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the
Department of Justice, in addition to private parties, to initiate
litigation and administrative proceedings against discriminating
landlords.103 This has shifted the burden of enforcement away
from the victims of discrimination, resulting in the filing of “hundreds of thousands of lawsuits” under the FHA—compared to only
“a handful” under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.104 Finally, the FHA
has been expanded to make unlawful housing policies that disparately affect members of the protected classes.105
Despite the FHA’s successes, however, many commentators
recognize that “minorities still face discrimination when trying to
rent an apartment or buy a home.”106 For instance, the development of new technology has enabled discrimination to become
“more subtle . . . [and] more difficult to detect.”107 One lawsuit alleged that Facebook, for example, had “permitt[ed] advertisers to
steer housing advertisements away from members of protected
classes.”108 In light of these new obstacles to eradicating housing
discrimination, the need for the FHA has not diminished. In fact,
on the Act’s fiftieth birthday commentators including U.S.

102 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (making it unlawful to “make, print, or publish . . . any
notice, statement, or advertisement . . . that indicates any . . . discrimination based on” a
protected class); see also Paul A. Jargowsky, Lei Ding & Natasha Fletcher, The Fair Housing Act at 50: Successes, Failures, and Future Directions, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 694, 701
(2019) (finding the FHA “somewhat successful” in preventing “overt racial discrimination
at the point of sale” and rental given that “[o]ne does not see whites only listed in advertisements” (emphasis in original)).
103 See Rachel M. Cohen, Taking Back the Suburbs: The Fair Housing Act at Fifty,
DISSENT, 2018, at 44. In contrast, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was much less effective
because it placed the burden solely on the victims “to enforce their own rights” via private
lawsuits. Id.
104 Id.
105 See John N. Robinson, Fair Housing After “Big Government”: How Tax Credits Are
Reshaping the Legal Fight Against Racial Segregation, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 752, 759–
60 (2019).
106 Julián Castro, The Fair Housing Act After Fifty Years: Opening Remarks, 40
CARDOZO L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2019); see also, e.g., Fair Housing Testing in Chicago Finds
Discrimination Based on Race and Source of Income, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL.
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/QT5H-ND2B (reporting that a fair-housing test in
Chicago revealed racial and source-of-income discrimination in dwelling rentals, including
“refusal to rent, differential terms and conditions applied, and residential steering”).
107 See O’Regan, supra note 101, at 706, 707 (“[A]s markets and mechanisms change,
new forms of discrimination may arise.”).
108 Id. at 707.
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Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Julián Castro have
called for “expand[ing] and not contract[ing]” its reach.109 Clearly,
protecting the FHA’s legal integrity remains vitally important to
combatting the deeply entrenched presence of housing
discrimination.
B. Cedar Point Jeopardizes the Constitutionality of the FHA’s
Antidiscrimination Provision Governing Dwelling Rentals
Despite its continuing significance, the FHA is now facing an
unprecedented danger. Specifically, Cedar Point’s holding calls
into question the constitutionality of its rental provision.110 To illustrate, this Comment will first provide an example of the rental
provision (contained in § 3604(a) of the FHA) in action.
In this hypothetical, an individual becomes a landlord by putting units within her apartment complex out for rent.111 In doing
so, she becomes subject to § 3604(a) and loses the right to discriminatorily select her tenants.112 After seeing an ad, a prospective
tenant applies to live in one of this landlord’s apartments for a
predetermined period of time. The prospective tenant is everything the landlord could hope for, but the landlord dislikes her
because of her race. If the landlord turns the prospective tenant
away—or excludes her from being able to occupy the apartment
as a tenant—the landlord has violated § 3604(a).
109 Castro, supra note 106, at 1096; see also Elizabeth Julian, The Fair Housing Act
at Fifty: Time for a Change, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1143–47 (2019) (noting that civil
rights advocates worry of a “lack of national commitment, or perhaps outright hostility, to
the principles that underlie the FHA” and recognizing a continued need to address the
shortcomings concerning the FHA’s enforcement by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development).
110 See Bowie, supra note 8, at 197 (focusing on rent-control policies when discussing
fair housing laws that may become unconstitutional takings after Cedar Point). The sales
provision is not at risk because the FHA does not grant a right to access the seller’s home.
The FHA prohibits sellers from refusing to sell their properties discriminatorily. See 42
U.S.C. § 3604. However, a sale transfers a property’s title and ownership. When a buyer
purchases and moves into a new home, she does not occupy the seller’s property; rather,
she occupies her own property. Although homebuyers are encouraged to attend open
houses and schedule home visits prior to making a purchase, the FHA does not require
sellers to provide these services to anybody.
111 See Landlord, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/NYJ6-72BX (defining landlord as “the owner of property (such as land, houses, or apartments) that is
leased or rented to another” (emphasis added)); see also Landlord, THE BRITANNICA
DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/95J2-T63A (“[A] person who owns a house, apartment, etc.,
and rents it to other people.”).
112 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). This hypothetical assumes that the landlord does not escape the FHA’s regulation via the Mrs. Murphy exemption (when a landlord lives in a
building with four or fewer units and rents out the other units).
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This hypothetical scenario illustrates the FHA’s similarities
to the California regulation in Cedar Point. First, both the hypothetical landlord and the agricultural employers seek to exclude
a segment of the public—racial minorities and union organizers—
from entering their property. Second, so long as the landlord continues to use her properties for their current purpose (renting to
tenants),113 § 3604(a) limits her right to exclude.114 In other words,
just as the California statute made unlawful the employer’s exercise of its right to exclude union organizers, § 3604(a) takes away
the landlord’s right to prevent racial minorities from occupying
her rental apartments as tenants.
Third, like the California regulation, the FHA authorizes a
noncontinuous but indefinite occupation of private property.
Here, the landlord’s rental apartment is subject to noncontinuous
occupation by minority tenants because each tenant’s stay is generally of a limited duration. A time gap likely exists between when
one minority tenant departs and when another such tenant enters. This is similar to how the Cedar Point employer’s property
was subject to union organizers’ presence for only three hours per
day. Meanwhile, like the employer’s property, the rental apartment is subject to indefinite occupation because under the FHA,
a landlord is legally unable to reject minority tenants for as long
as she holds that apartment out for rent.
Further, more abstractly, Cedar Point’s special veneration of
the right to exclude implies an ideology that contradicts the one
underlying the FHA’s enactment. The Court’s Takings Clause decisions generally state the importance of an individual’s property
right to exclude. Earlier cases, including Loretto, did so in concise
terms: “The power to exclude has traditionally been considered
one of the most treasured strands” of property rights.115 By contrast, Cedar Point bolstered the importance of the right to exclude
by citing historical commentaries that hailed its necessity

113 The fact that the limitation on a person’s right to exclude depends on him or her
continuing to be a landlord does not prevent a court from finding a per se taking. See supra
Part I.B.2 (discussing Loretto). Cedar Point likely did not disturb this conclusion because
it expanded rather than contracted the definition of a per se taking.
114 See Rent Stabilization Ass’n of N.Y.C. v. Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626, 633 (N.Y. 1993)
(“[T]he antidiscrimination laws eliminate an owner’s unfettered discretion in rejecting
tenants.”). Because a landlord cannot exclude, the FHA has effectively created a right of
access in the minority tenants.
115 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–
80 (1979)).
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immediately after reciting the text of the Takings Clause.116 By
going beyond making a concise statement, Cedar Point further
accentuated the significance of this exclusionary right.
Indeed, an individual’s right to exclude seemed so crucial that
the Cedar Point Court felt compelled to stretch its takings jurisprudence117 to protect the right over safeguarding the democratic
interests of the disenfranchised Black and Brown farmworkers118—interests, for example, in seeking union organizers’ help to
protest against exploitative employers and “low wages, dirty
bathrooms, and harassment from supervisors.”119 Similar to how
the California statute aimed to empower the farmworkers, the
FHA was enacted to counteract antidemocratic forces and “dominating social hierarchies”120 by protecting the oftendisenfranchised minorities’ interests in housing.121 Given the
Court’s willingness to undermine the farmworkers’ interests for
the sake of individuals’ property rights, the Court’s similar potential to undermine minority tenants’ interests becomes a
serious concern.
The FHA’s similarity to the California regulation at issue in
Cedar Point creates a serious possibility that courts might recognize it as a per se taking that requires just compensation. Such a
move has substantial consequences for both the Act and the antidiscrimination principles it embodies. Specifically, requiring the
government to compensate a landlord for interfering with her
right to exclude a potential tenant would impede the FHA’s enforceability—if the government must pay, it cannot effectively enforce the law.122 Moreover, a finding that the FHA constitutes a
taking would likely establish a societal entitlement in the “right
to discriminate” (for there would be a monetary value attached to
this “right”). It suggests that, rather than an important public

116

See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2071; Berger, supra note 71, at 314.
See supra Part I.C.
118 Professor Bowie defined “democracy” as “political equality” and described the
United States’ most democratic moment as Election Day, when all eligible voters “are
treated as political equals . . . in their electoral district[s].” Bowie, supra note 8, at 172.
Meanwhile, “antidemocracy protect[s] dominating social hierarchies, particularly those
based on property.” Id. at 175.
119 Id. at 196 (quoting David Bacon, The Real Target in the Supreme Court’s ‘Cedar
Point’ Decision, THE NATION (July 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/XAS5-C9QS).
120 Id. at 175.
121 Both the Court and Congress have recognized that racial discrimination is related
to the badges and incidents of slavery, and the first fair housing law was passed with this
in mind. See supra Part I.A.
122 Cf. Bowie, supra note 8, at 196.
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policy to be pursued, antidiscrimination must instead be purchased, which could slow future efforts toward achieving equality.
Of course, the Court may nonetheless be reluctant to rule
that the FHA constitutes a per se taking. The absence of discussion pertaining to race in Cedar Point indicates this hesitation. In
the facts section, the majority opinion described the agricultural
employees only as “seasonal workers” and “full-time workers”
who did not live on their employer’s property.123 But as Professors
Bowie and Veena Dubal have noted, these race-neutral characterizations hardly present the whole picture. The California regulation specifically aimed to protect minority workers from exploitation in the workplace, and the employees were mainly Black or
Brown.124 The opinion also failed to acknowledge the nuances of
the Cedar Point employers’ legal stance, which (as Bowie characterized it) “resurrected a segregationist argument that employers
have a right to discriminate.”125
In light of this racial backdrop, the majority’s race-neutral
opinion is informative of its stance on antidiscrimination laws
with respect to the Takings Clause. As noted previously, these
laws’ roots and histories are intertwined with those of the constitutional amendments that abolished slavery—whose passage had
marked a significant turning point in the United States history.
In addition, antidiscrimination continues to receive significant
public and scholarly discourse.126 Given the majority’s asserted
disinclination against proclaiming a large swarth of statutes to be
per se takings, its silence regarding race is unlikely to represent
a desire to secretly and silently do so for antidiscrimination
laws—which hold significant social, political, and historical
weight.

123

Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2069.
See The LPE Project, Property Rights Against Democracy: Implications of Cedar
Point Nursery, (Oct. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/6F5P-G82E.
125 See Bowie, supra note 8, at 192 (discussing the employers’ brief). According to
Professor Bowie, the employers in effect argued that “the Fifth Amendment’s protection of
‘private property’ includes the right of a property owner to exclude whomever it wants
from its property.” Id. (citing Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 29–32, Cedar Point, 141
S. Ct. 2063 (2021) (No. 20-107)). Specifically, the employers argued that “this right to discriminate was protected” by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ku Klux Klan Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute that “extended the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection to
Black farmworkers in the South,” despite the argument “ha[ving] twice been rejected by
the Supreme Court” prior to Cedar Point. Id. at 191–92.
126 See supra Part II.A (describing various commentaries on the shortcomings of the
FHA).
124
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The remaining question, therefore, is how to read the FHA’s
dwelling rental provision to avoid a holding that it amounts to a
per se taking under Cedar Point. In addressing this issue, this
Comment notes that in the hypothetical scenario described in
Part II.A, the analogy between the rental and union-organizer situations is not perfect. A notable difference is that, at the outset,
the agricultural employer welcomed only employees onsite.127
Meanwhile, the hypothetical landlord extended her invitation to
everyone but racial minorities. In other words, the agricultural
employer’s premises were generally closed to members of the public. By contrast, the landlord’s rental properties were
generally open.
In the following Part, this Comment will discuss the paths
that courts could take to avoid a holding that the FHA amounts
to a per se taking. It reasons, building on the aforementioned difference between landlords and employers, that the FHA falls
under one of Cedar Point’s four enumerated exceptions to its holding—specifically, the business-open-to-the-public exception.
III. PREVENTING THE FHA FROM BECOMING A PER SE TAKING
Cedar Point’s expansion of the definition of per se takings
concerned the dissenting justices and various scholars.128 In response to Justice Stephen Breyer’s worry that Cedar Point would
endanger many governmental regulations,129 the Court carved out
four scenarios where its holding130 would not apply: trespass,
background property principles, receipt of governmental benefit,
and when a statute regulates a business open to the public.131 This
Comment argues that the Cedar Point exceptions provide an escape valve for the FHA from becoming a per se taking. Part III.A
describes the four Cedar Point exceptions in greater detail.
Part III.B argues that the FHA fits within the business-open-tothe-public exception. Part III.B.3 finds additional support for this
argument by drawing parallels between modern dwellings for
127

See Bowie, supra note 8, at 197.
See, e.g., Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2081 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Bowie, supra
note 8, at 197–98; Blackman, supra note 84.
129 See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2087–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority opinion endangers health and safety regulations that allow government officials
to come onto private property to conduct examinations).
130 See id. at 2079 (majority opinion) (“Under this framework, government health and
safety inspection regimes will generally not constitute takings.”).
131 See id. at 2076–79 (asserting that the dissent’s fears are “unfounded” immediately
before describing the exceptions to the holding).
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rent and hotels, which, under the common law innkeeper’s rule,
are required to accept guests without discrimination. Finally,
Part III.C explores other methods for protecting the FHA and the
merits of doing so through the business-open-to-the-public
exception.
A. The Four Cedar Point Exceptions
Of the four Cedar Point exceptions, three do not provide viable pathways to save the FHA’s rental provision from becoming a
per se taking. This Section starts by describing these three exceptions and their inapplicability and concludes by laying out the
fourth, business-open-to-the-public exception.
The first exception to Cedar Point’s holding is trespass, which
is not analyzed under the takings doctrine.132 Trespasses, according to the Court, are “[i]solated physical invasions, not
undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access.”133 An illustrative example is a “truckdriver parking on someone’s vacant land
to eat lunch,” a one-time activity not conducted with any governmental authorizations.134 The FHA does not fall under this exception because the scenario it regulates—a landlord renting their
property to tenants—does not involve trespasses. Rather, dwelling rentals involve prolonged physical occupations, and, as Part II
argued, the FHA provides a statutorily granted right of access for
minority tenants.
The second exception encompasses physical invasions “consistent with longstanding background restrictions on property
rights,” which are not takings.135 These background principles
“encompass traditional common law privileges to access private
property” and include strangers’ power to enter another’s property due to “public or private necessity,” the need to “avert serious
harm to a person, land, or chattels,” and the enforcement of criminal laws.136 The FHA also likely does not fit under this exception
because the right of access created by the FHA bears no relationship to already-established background property principles. The
132

Id. at 2078.
Id. The Court also stated that a “continuance of [trespasses] in sufficient number
and for a sufficient time could prove [the intent to take property]” and consequently be
analyzed under the takings doctrine. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Portsmouth
Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329 (1922)).
134 See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct at 2078 (quoting Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d
1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
135 Id. at 2079.
136 Id.
133
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common law did not bar landlords from selecting their tenants on
a discriminatory basis,137 and private housing discrimination
remained lawful until 1968.138 Moreover, while longstanding statutes may become background property principles,139 the Cedar
Point Court found that the California regulation, a fifty-year-old
law, was not “longstanding.”140 Because the FHA is about as old
as the Cedar Point regulation, it could plausibly receive similar
treatment.
Third, “the government may require property owners to cede
a right of access as a condition of receiving certain benefits.”141
This exception addresses governmental exactions, where the government “conditions the grant of a benefit such as a permit . . . on
allowing access [to the landowner’s property] for reasonable
health and safety inspections.”142 This exception likewise does not
apply to the FHA because its provisions do not implicate such
exactions.
Finally, Cedar Point’s holding does not apply to governmental appropriation of property rights belonging to “a business generally open to the public.”143 The Court created this exception by
distinguishing Cedar Point from PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins,144 which held that a state constitution’s protection of the
right to distribute leaflets in a private shopping center—a business open to the public—did not constitute a taking.145 Under this
exception, a regulation granting equal opportunity to access a
business open to the public does not constitute a per se taking.
Unlike the other three exceptions, the business-open-to-thepublic exception plausibly covers the dwelling-rental scenario
regulated by the FHA. From a logical standpoint, one could frame
the rental situation as landowners welcoming members of the
public to shop for places to live, the same way a mall invites the
public to purchase goods. The next Section will explore this

137 The innkeeper’s rule, which prohibits innkeepers from discriminating in accepting
guests, is a special case at common law. See supra Part II.B.3.
138 See supra Part I.A.
139 See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel G. Wolfard, Revisiting Background Principles in
Takings Litigation, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1165, 1193–1202 (2019).
140 Bowie, supra note 8, at 195–96; Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2080.
141 Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2079.
142 Id.
143 See id. at 2077.
144 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
145 Cf. id. at 77, 84.
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exception in further detail and argue that it extends to the FHA
from a legal standpoint.
B. The FHA Establishes a Right to Access Businesses Open to
the Public
Under the business-open-to-the-public exception, regulations
that grant strangers a right to access businesses open to the public are not per se takings. Instead, such regulations are evaluated
under the government-friendly Penn Central regulatory-takings
framework. This Section argues that the FHA’s rental provision
is one such regulation: it established a right to access rental
dwellings, which this Comment argues are businesses open to the
public.
Part III.B.1 explores two definitions of business open to the
public found in Cedar Point: (1) properties covered by publicaccommodation statutes and (2) properties that fall within the
Court’s own understanding of this terminology. Parts III.B.2 and
III.B.3 will then illustrate that the rental properties regulated by
the FHA are open to the public under the second definition.
Finding that dwelling rentals are businesses open to the public means breaking down the differences between rental homes,
perhaps the most private places, and shopping malls. But at the
same time, this approach is consistent with a few different lines
of precedent. First, placing the FHA within the business-open-tothe-public exception is consistent with Cedar Point’s unwillingness to disturb a large swath of important antidiscrimination
regulations. Further, as explained below, Congress and the courts
have implicitly acknowledged the less-than-private nature of
some dwelling-rental scenarios; this solution would not disturb
landlords’ and tenants’ expectations of privacy in practice. For
those reasons—as well as the normative value of preserving an
important antidiscrimination law from constitutional challenge—
courts should consider the FHA to be within Cedar Point’s
business-open-to-the-public exception.
1. Cedar Point suggests there are two definitions of a
business open to the public.
An examination of Cedar Point’s analysis of PruneYard and
choice of case citations reveals that the Court drew the meaning
of a business open to the public from two sources: (1) publicaccommodation statutes and (2) its own interpretation as shown
in Cedar Point and in its First Amendment jurisprudence. The
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subsequent sections shall discuss the definition drawn from each
source in turn.
a) Businesses open to the public include those defined by
public-accommodation statutes. Cedar Point implied that statutorily defined public accommodations are businesses open to the
public in the Takings Clause context. This implication is evinced
by the Court’s reference to Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States146 while discussing the business-open-to-the-public
exception.
Cedar Point created this exception by distinguishing the
California statute, which governed agricultural employers, from
the state constitution at issue in PruneYard, which restricted a
shopping center’s right to exclude leaflet distributors from its
premises.147 Cedar Point explained that the state constitution did
not effect a taking because the place it regulated—the shopping
mall—was “open to the public.”148 Considering the Court’s focus
on PruneYard, its insertion of a citation to Heart of Atlanta was
surprising. Heart of Atlanta, after all, did not concern shopping
malls. Instead, it pertained to the constitutionality of Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964149 as applied to motels.150
The Court further did not portray Heart of Atlanta as relevant to its discussion of PruneYard. Rather, it characterized
Heart of Atlanta as a case “rejecting [the] claim that provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting racial discrimination in
public accommodations effected a taking.”151 And finally, Bowie
and other scholars contend that the Court “would have silently
overruled . . . its 1964 decision upholding the Civil Rights Act,”
namely, Heart of Atlanta, without the open-to-the-public exception.152 The Court’s citation, then, was a deliberate action that
forcefully suggests that public accommodations, like shopping
centers, are businesses open to the public, thereby folding public-

146
147
148
149

379 U.S. 241 (1964).
See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2076.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C).
150
151
152

See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 243–45.
Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2076 (citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261).
Bowie, supra note 8, at 194.
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accommodation
statutes
like
Title II
under
this
153
exception.
This definition does not help the FHA, however, because the
dwelling rentals it regulates are likely not places of public accommodation. For example, the American with Disabilities Act of
1990,154 a statute regulating public accommodations, makes it
clear that places of public accommodation do not include “strictly
residential private apartments and homes”—in other words,
rental dwellings.155 The Court is also unlikely to interpret Title II,
the public-accommodation statute whose constitutionality was
explicitly saved by Cedar Point, to cover rental dwellings. After
all, the FHA, or Title VIII, is a separate part of the Civil Rights
Act, and such a broad reading of Title II would render the FHA
superfluous. Given the unhelpfulness of the “public accommodations” definition, this Comment now turns to the Court’s definition of a business open to the public.
b) The Court defined a business open to the public in
PruneYard and similar First Amendment cases. The second, distinct source from which the Court drew its definition of a business
open to the public is PruneYard. In addition to rendering a decision on Fifth Amendment regulatory takings,156 PruneYard also
concerned a question in a different context. Specifically, it belonged to a line of First Amendment cases that considered
whether shopping mall owners could prohibit strangers from coming onsite to protest, distribute pamphlets, or otherwise exercise
their freedom of speech.157 The meaning of a business open to the
public has been especially crucial to these cases because,

153 Cedar Point cited Heart of Atlanta in support of the statement that “[a]pplying the
Penn Central factors, we held that no compensable taking had occurred” with respect to
the shopping center. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2076.
154 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213). The
ADA’s definition of “public accommodations” is relevant because the Court’s characterization of Heart of Atlanta suggests a broad exemption from its holding of statutes regulating
public accommodations. The ADA is therefore likely to be within the business-open-to-thepublic exception.
155 See ADA National Network, Does the ADA Cover Private Apartments and Private
Homes?, ADA NAT’L NETWORK (Oct. 2021), https://perma.cc/9FVV-H8E6. Similarly,
Title II defines “places of public accommodation” as “[e]stablishments affecting interstate
commerce or supported in their activities by State action . . . [such as] lodgings; facilities
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises; gasoline stations;
[and] places of exhibition or entertainment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
156 See supra notes 144–145 and accompanying text.
157 See, e.g., PruneYard, 447 U.S. 74 (evaluating the passing of pamphlets); Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (evaluating picketing).
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according to the Court in Marsh v. Alabama,158 the more an owner
“opens up” her property for public use, the more her rights
“become circumscribed by the . . . constitutional rights of those
who use it.”159 As such, it was during these First Amendment
inquiries that the Court closely examined what constitutes such
a business.160
Importantly, the Court did not use public-accommodation
statutes as an aid to establish the meaning of a business open to
the public.161 Rather, it determined whether the malls were open
to the public through fact-based reasoning.162 As discussed in further detail below, the Court’s definition in the First Amendment
context can be summarized as follows: a business open to the public welcomes anyone in the general population onsite.
A business open to the public is generally accessible, meaning
it does not limit access to particular individuals. The Court’s focus
on this factor started with Marsh, the progenitor of the First
Amendment cases concerning shopping centers. In Marsh, a state
punished an individual for distributing religious literature on the
sidewalks of a company-owned town in violation of the town’s regulations.163 Although the town was private, the Court held that
the punishment was unconstitutional in light of the First
Amendment because the business block was open to the public.164
In reaching this conclusion, the Court highlighted that the business block “serve[d] as the community shopping center and is
freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those
passing through.”165 In other words, the company town had no
prohibition regarding whom could go onsite.
Likewise, in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc.,166 the Court held that peaceful picketing in a shopping mall’s
158

326 U.S. 501 (1946).
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 506.
160 See infra notes 173–174 and accompanying text. In the Takings Clause context,
Cedar Point was the case that made “business open to the public” a formal category.
161 See generally Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (determining, without
examining public-accommodation statutes, that malls were private in the First
Amendment free speech context); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (same). Cedar
Point itself defined this term by distinguishing the characteristics of Cedar Point Nursery
from those of PruneYard Shopping Center. See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2076. Like the
earlier cases involving shopping malls, Cedar Point did not look to public-accommodation
statutes as an aid for defining the phrase “business open to the public.”
162 See, e.g., Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508.
163 See id. at 502–04.
164 See id. at 506, 509.
165 Id. at 508.
166 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
159
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parcel pickup area by individuals not associated with the mall is
speech protected by the First Amendment.167 It reasoned that the
mall is a “location open generally to the public,”168 and any member of the public has “unrestricted access to the mall property”
given the ample roads and sidewalks that lead onto the premises.169 Analogizing to Marsh, the Court further characterized the
mall as a business district contained in one building.170 This suggests that whether a property is open to the public is not reliant
on its size or physical structure; what truly matters is whether it
invites all members of the public.
The First Amendment case law took a sharp turn, however,
with Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.171 At issue was whether “under the
Federal Constitution a privately owned shopping center may
prohibit the distribution of handbills on its property when the
handbilling is unrelated to the shopping center’s operations.”172
Citing Logan Valley, the handbill distributors argued that the
shopping center may not prohibit their handbilling because it
“[wa]s open to the public.”173 Rejecting the distributors’ argument,
the Lloyd Court held that a private mall that invites the public
“to use it for designated purposes,” such as shopping, does not lose
“its private character.”174
In deciding a similar issue, PruneYard affirmatively cited
Lloyd’s conclusion that the First Amendment does not require the
mall owner to allow on-premises pamphlet distribution.175 At the
same time, PruneYard characterized the mall as open to the public—meaning generally accessible—as a factual matter.176
PruneYard therefore made clear that a mall may be open to the
167

See id. at 316–19.
Id. at 313.
169 Id. at 318.
170 See id. at 319.
171 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
172 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 80 (citing Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 552).
173 Id. (citing Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 564).
174 Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569 (“Few would argue that a free-standing store, with abutting
parking space for customers, assumes significant public attributes merely because the
public is invited to shop there.”).
175 See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 80–81. PruneYard nonetheless reached a different result than Lloyd because, in PruneYard, the state constitution required the mall owner to
allow such handbilling. See id. at 81. As PruneYard stated, “Our reasoning in Lloyd [ ]
does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its
sovereign right” to confer more rights on individuals via its own constitution than “those
conferred by the Federal Constitution.” Id.
176 See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 74 (“PruneYard is open to the public for the purpose
of encouraging the patronizing of its commercial establishments.”).
168
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public because it does not restrict who can enter (as in Marsh and
Logan Valley), but that fact alone is not enough to overcome its
private nature and circumscribe its owner’s rights with the First
Amendment rights of the public. Put differently, the mall was not
sufficiently public for free speech obligations under the First
Amendment to attach to its owner.
By crafting an exception to its holding based on PruneYard,
Cedar Point effectively imported the business-open-to-the-public
exception into the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause context. It
did not incorporate the nuances added by Lloyd, however. By excepting a provision (state constitution) that applied to the
PruneYard mall from being a per se taking because the mall was
“a business generally open to the public,”177 the Court made clear
that the range of activities permitted by a landowner does not
matter in the Takings Clause context (unlike in the First Amendment context). Instead, status as a business open to the public
depends only on the range of people invited onto the premises.
It is worth noting that Cedar Point did not explicitly base its
distinction between public and private businesses on the facts
considered by the First Amendment cases. It characterized the
PruneYard mall, which “welcom[es] some 25,000 patrons a day,”
as open to the public while implying that Cedar Point Nursery,
supposedly closed to everyone but its employees, was private.178
While the Court’s language could be read to suggest that only
businesses with large visitor flows are open to the public, the size
of an establishment’s visitor flow is likely not dispositive.
Consider this scenario: a duplicate of the PruneYard mall is built
in a rural town and welcomes only one-hundred patrons a day.
Making visitor flow dispositive of a business’s public-versusprivate nature would cause this exact copy of the PruneYard to
be designated as private. The Court’s language, therefore, is best
read as being consistent with how First Amendment cases have
defined “open to the public” in terms of general accessibility, rather than imposing an additional size-of-visitor-flow factor.
In summary, the business-open-to-the-public category originated from a series of First Amendment cases and formally became a part of the Takings Clause jurisprudence after Cedar
Point. Although Cedar Point implied a highly factual definition
for this term based on the size of a business’s visitor flow, the logic

177
178

Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2077.
Id. at 2076.
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underlying this rationale is unstable. In light of this ambiguity,
how the First Amendment cases understood this term remains
highly relevant. That understanding, infused with Cedar Point’s
own input, suggests that a business open to the public in the
Takings Clause context is one that invites the general population
onsite.
2. The rental situation regulated by the FHA likely falls
under the Supreme Court’s definition of a business open
to the public.
This Section contends that dwelling rentals regulated by the
FHA meet the definition of businesses open to the public. It begins by arguing that such rentals could be viewed as businesses
that invite the public onsite for limited purposes. It then argues
that viewing such rentals as ones that invite the general population is consistent with existing case law and aligns with the FHA’s
legislative history. It concludes by exploring a caveat to the view
that dwelling rentals are generally accessible: if the FHA did not
prohibit discrimination, dwelling rentals might not in fact be generally accessible.
To start off, the rental of dwellings covered by the FHA
should be viewed as a business. Specifically, the landlord’s activities are distinguishable from those of ordinary homeowners
because, like mall owners, the landlord is making money by engaging in commercial transactions.179 Further, the commercial nature of renting an apartment complex bears some similarities to
running a shopping center, which also involves leasing spaces to
individual stores and establishments. Finally, a landlord extends
invitations to potential renters for a limited purpose: to occupy
her rental dwellings as tenants. The fact that this is a limited
purpose (for instance, the public cannot venture into a rental
property to distribute pamphlets) does not matter in the open-topublic analysis.
Next, this Section turns to the most critical inquiry in determining whether dwelling rentals are businesses open to the public: whether they are generally accessible. The Court suggested
179 Whether something is a “business” was not the Court’s concern in either the First
Amendment cases concerning shopping centers or in Cedar Point. There is likely little
dispute that a shopping center is a business. Cedar Point was silent on whether an agricultural employer who hires employees and presumably earns revenue runs a business.
See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2076 (“Unlike the growers’ properties, the PruneYard was
open to the public.”).
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an answer in the affirmative in Yee v. City of Escondido.180 Yee
concerned the rental of mobile-home park spaces. The case addressed whether a local rent-control ordinance, when viewed
together with a California Mobilehome Residency Law,181 constituted a Loretto-type per se physical taking of mobile home–park
owners’ property.182 Mobile homes are “largely immobile” residences and are “generally placed permanently” in mobile-home
parks.183 A mobile-home owner “typically rents a plot of land,
called a ‘pad,’” from a park owner to use as the location of her
home,184 much like how tenants rent apartments from landlords.185
The rent-control laws at issue in Yee limited a property
owner’s right to exclude in similar ways as the FHA. The laws
required the park owners to keep their rents below the fair market value and protect tenants from eviction,186 effectively allowing
tenants to occupy their pads at below-market rates indefinitely.187
As the park owners in Yee argued, the laws required them to submit to the physical occupation of their property by the owners of
mobile homes.188
The Court found that the rent-control laws did not amount to
a per se taking. It determined that the laws did not force a landlord to suffer a physical occupation because the landlord had “voluntarily decided to rent” her property.189 The laws additionally did
not grant tenants the right “to invade property closed to the public.”190 Rather, the Court stated that the tenants were invited by
180

503 U.S. 519 (1992).
Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 798 (West 1982 and Supp. 1991).
182 See id. at 523.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Cf., e.g., Rent Stabilization Ass’n of N.Y.C. v. Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626, 632–33
(N.Y. 1993) (treating Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), a case about renting
pads in a mobile home park, as binding precedent in a case about renting apartments);
Ballinger v. City of Oakland, 24 F.4th 1287, 1292–94 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 142 S.
Ct. 2777 (2022) (relying heavily on Yee in its analysis of a municipal ordinance requiring
landlords pay tenants a relocation fee before the owner could move back into her home).
186 See Dwight C. Hirsh IV, Yee v. City of Escondido—A Rejection of the Ninth
Circuit’s Unique Physical Takings Theory Opens the Gates for Mobile Home Park Owners’
Regulatory Takings Claims, 24 PAC. L.J. 1681, 1699–1700 (1993) (describing the regulations at issue in Yee).
187 See Yee, 503 U.S. at 526–27. The park owners retain the power to evict in some
circumstances, such as when they wish to change their use of land, if they provide notice
to the homeowners ahead of time. See id. at 528.
188 See id. at 527.
189 See Hirsh, supra note 186, at 1707.
190 Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2077 (emphasis added).
181
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the landlords at the first instance, and “it is the invitation, not
the rent,” that distinguished Yee from per se taking cases like
Loretto.191
The Court’s statements in Yee suggest that, given that the
park owners had broadly invited tenants to rent, their parks were
open to the public. This understanding likely extends to the dwelling-rental situation even though mobile-home parks have different physical characteristics than apartment complexes for rent.
For example, Yee affirmatively referred to both the park owners
and the owners of rental dwellings as “landlords.”192 Additionally,
although Yee rejected the park owners’ attempt to analogize their
situation to the per se taking experienced by the landlord in
Loretto, it did not distinguish Loretto based on the physical differences between the properties run by a park owner and the building units run by a more traditional landlord.193 These facts reveal
that the Court likely considered mobile park rentals and dwelling
rentals as the same type of business. Consequently, rental dwellings should not be considered closed to the public.
A finding that rental dwellings regulated by the FHA are
open to the public is consistent with the Act’s legislative history.
During debates on the Mrs. Murphy exemption, legislators
acknowledged that rental situations possess varying degrees of
privacy. Situations where small landlords share the same building space with their tenants are the most private.194 By contrast,
situations involving landlords who own hundreds of rental units
are less private and personal.195 In choosing to exempt the former
from the FHA, the drafters intentionally drew a line between
landlords whose businesses are clearly private and those whose
businesses are more public and more deserving of regulation.
However, there remains one caveat to this publicaccessibility analysis concerning dwelling rentals. In Rent Stabilization Ass’n v. Higgins,196 another case about whether a rent191 See Yee, 503 U.S. at 532 (quoting FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252–53
(1987)). The Yee Court unanimously rejected the idea that a per se taking was at issue.
See generally id.
192 See id. at 528–29.
193 See Yee, 503 U.S. at 530–32.
194 See James D. Walsh, Note, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs.
Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605, 609–10 (1999).
195 Cf. id. at 607 (noting that a co-sponsor of the FHA declared that the “sole intent of
[the Mrs. Murphy exemption] is to exempt those who, by the direct personal nature of their
activities, have a close personal relationship with their tenants” (alteration in original)
(quoting 114 CONG. REC. 2495 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale))).
196 630 N.E.2d 626 (N.Y. 1993).
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control law amounts to a per se taking,197 the New York Court of
Appeals cited Yee for the proposition that “once a property owner
decides to rent to tenants, the antidiscrimination laws eliminate
an owner’s unfettered discretion in rejecting tenants.”198 Higgins’s
proposition suggests that the FHA is what made dwelling rentals
generally accessible—that is, open to the public. After all, even if
a landlord wished to limit her invitation to rent to a racial subgroup, § 3604(a) of the FHA, which makes such discrimination
unlawful, would act as an addendum that extends her invitation
to
the
entire public.
Higgins’s proposition breaks down when the FHA’s constitutionality is called into question. If § 3604(a) is a per se taking, the
government would be required to pay a landlord “every time it
interferes with [his] ‘right to exclude’” a potential tenant “from
[her] property.”199 As Bowie’s article implies, requiring such payments would make the FHA unenforceable, which in effect returns to landlords the power to limit their invitations by race and
other protected characteristics.200 In practice, even with limited
invitations, a landlord’s invitation to rent might still be extended
to a sizeable portion of the population (such as every individual
belonging to a particular race). However, that invitation is not as
broad as an invitation to shop and could start to look like the
extremely narrow employee-only invitations made by the agricultural employers in Cedar Point.
In sum, Higgins implies that dwelling rentals could be considered open to the public only because of antidiscrimination statutes like the FHA. Thus, analyzing whether the FHA constitutes
a per se taking requires dealing with a counterfactual scenario
where the FHA is absent. In the next Section, this Comment argues—analogizing the rental of dwellings to innkeeping—that the
common law innkeeper’s rule should be extended to the former
business; doing so supports the notion that, even without the
FHA, dwelling rentals should be considered open to the public.
3. The rental of dwellings regulated by the FHA should be

197

See id. at 632.
Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
199 Bowie, supra note 8, at 196.
200 Cf. id. at 196–97 (suggesting that Cedar Point’s threat to antiretaliation laws
means that employers regain the power to retaliate against whistleblowing employees).
198
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analogized to common law innkeeping.
This Section aims to find an alternative ground in the common law innkeeper’s rule showing that rental dwellings should be
considered generally accessible and therefore open to the public.
It first strives to link the rental of dwellings to innkeeping via
potential threads found within case law. It subsequently analogizes these businesses and argues that, given their growing similarities, the common law supports viewing both as similarly open
to the public.
Earlier discussions have shown that the rental of dwellings
and innkeeping (or, in modern terms, hotelkeeping) are treated
as distinct types of business under the law.201 However, some
court cases, including one in the Supreme Court, suggest that this
distinction may be smaller than it seems. For example, the Court
wrote the following statement in Yee: “When a landowner decides
to rent his land to tenants, the government may . . . require the
landowner to accept tenants he does not like without automatically having to pay compensation.”202
Notice that Yee cited Heart of Atlanta and PruneYard for this
proposition.203 As an initial matter, these citations lend support to
the general idea that, when Yee was decided, antidiscrimination
laws were analyzed under the Penn Central regulatory takings
framework, rather than the per se takings framework.204 Indeed,
Heart of Atlanta and PruneYard had performed a regulatory takings analysis of Title II (a public-accommodations statute) and of
a state constitution restricting a mall owner’s right to prohibit onpremises leafletting, respectively.
Importantly, though, Yee did not cite both cases at once; it
cited Heart of Atlanta in the middle of the sentence and
201 For example, the FHA was crafted as a separate Act from Title II, which covers
hotels and motels.
202 Yee, 503 U.S. at 529 (citations omitted) (first citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at
261; and then citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82–84); cf. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440 (citing
Heart of Atlanta as a case affirming the government’s power to regulate the landlordtenant relationship).
203 As Cedar Point’s citation to Heart of Atlanta in its PruneYard discussion illustrates, the Court’s citation choices may convey important substantive messages. Like
Cedar Point’s legal reasoning in support of its holding demonstrates, it is possible for the
Court to breathe new life into previously unimportant language in its precedents to
achieve its desired outcome. See supra Part I.C and Part II.B.
204 See Yee, 503 U.S. at 529 (holding that “[s]uch [regulations of the landlord-tenant
relationship] are analyzed by engaging in” the regulatory takings analysis). This
Comment argues that Cedar Point likely requires analyzing antidiscrimination laws first
under the per se framework.
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PruneYard in a “see also” citation at the end of the sentence. This
creates the possibility of reading the Heart of Atlanta citation
solely to support the statement preceding it—namely, Yee’s proposition that the government could constitutionally limit a landlord’s right to exclude. Considering that Heart of Atlanta upheld
the constitutionality of Title II as applied to motels, Yee’s citation
could induce the following inference: the government’s constitutional authority to limit a motel owner’s right to exclude was used
to support the government having a similar constitutional power
to restrict the same right with respect to landlords. This reasoning hints at some similarities between motel operations and
dwelling rentals. While not binding on the Court, Higgins seemed
to support this understanding.205 Because Title II, according to
Heart of Atlanta, codified “the common-law innkeeper rule,”206
Yee’s citation, read in the aforementioned way, could support
extending this common law rule’s applicability to the rental
scenario.
The common law innkeepers rule imposed a duty on innkeepers to accept all guests because the innkeeper’s business was a
“common calling.”207 The concept of a common calling arose out of
the innkeeper’s special place in the medieval English society,208
where travelers were often forced to traverse roads and forests
“infested with robbers.”209 Inns, which offered protection, food,
and entertainment, became a critical part of travelers’ livelihoods.210 Unlike medieval tenants, who had more power to bargain with landlords,211 travelers were often “at the mercy of the
innkeeper” because inns were few and far between.212 These conditions created a need to forbid innkeepers from rejecting guests
on a discriminatory basis.213

205 See Higgins, 630 N.E.2d at 633 (“Indeed, once a property owner decides to rent to
tenants, the antidiscrimination laws eliminate an owner’s unfettered discretion in rejecting tenants.”).
206 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261.
207 Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem,
17 HARV. L. REV. 156, 159 (1904).
208 See id.
209 JOHN H. SHERRY, THE LAWS OF INNKEEPERS 3 (1972).
210 See id. at 3–4.
211 See id. at 12–13.
212 Wyman, supra note 207, at 159.
213 Cf. id. at 160–61, 164, 166.
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Modern-day landlords exercise a similar public calling.214
While not as crucial as medieval inns, dwelling rentals are highly
important to the modern public. Statistics show that roughly
30–35% percent of U.S. households rented their homes between
1998 and 2021.215 Additionally, the Court has noted that housing
conditions and landlord-tenant relationships deserve special regulation.216 Moreover, minority tenants have persistently faced
greater difficulties and more limited housing options in the rental
market, which raises questions as to their capacity to bargain
with landlords. For example, a 2012 study found that “[w]hite
renters experience more favorable treatment than equally wellqualified [Black renters] in 28.4 percent of housing inquiries,”
Hispanic renters in 28.9% of inquiries, and Asian renters in 32.0%
of inquiries.217 By comparison, Black, Hispanic, and Asian renters
receive more favorable treatment in only 19.6%, 18.9%, and 22.6%
of interactions respectively.218 In addition, Black, Hispanic, and
Asian renters on average learn of about 10% fewer available units
from rental agents than white renters.219 Further, white renters
are more likely to be “informed about rent incentives” than Black
and Hispanic renters, which “possibly giv[es] them more bargaining power in lease negotiations.”220
Modern circumstances have reduced the distinction that once
existed between inns and dwelling rentals, specifically in connection with their respective occupants. Under the common law, inns
214 Case law indicates that a business’s surrounding circumstances determine
whether it is a public or private calling; as such, businesses once considered private can
be recharacterized as public callings. See id. at 160–61. It is possible, of course, that hotel
owners exercise less of a public calling in modern times. Today, there are more hotels for
travelers to select from, internet services that let travelers choose their hotels and amenities, and hotel competitors like Airbnb. However, the usage of hotels has not fallen into
disfavor, suggesting that hotels continue to occupy an important place in modern society.
Further, antidiscrimination considerations regarding the hospitality industry, especially
in light of discrimination concerns regarding Airbnb, provide normative support for continuing to view the hotel business as a public calling.
215 Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Home Ownership, Fourth Quarter 2021, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 2, 2022), https://perma.cc/4JA5-92DU.
216 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440 (“This Court has consistently affirmed that States
have broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular.”).
217 MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, ROB SANTOS, DIANE K. LEVY, DOUG WISSOKER,
CLAUDIA ARANDA, ROB PITINGOLO & THE URB. INST., HOUS. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 2012, 40 (2013).
218 See id.
219 U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Subtle Forms of Discrimination Still Exist for
Minority Homeseekers, THE EDGE, https://perma.cc/39FH-P8JC.
220 TURNER ET AL., supra note 217, at 42, 45.
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were defined by their primary service of guests, who were in turn
defined by the transient nature of their stays.221 Transiency did
not necessarily hinge on the occupant’s length of stay or distance
of travel; instead, it depended on factors including whether the
occupant was a stranger to the innkeeper and whether he had
entered the premises in accordance with the inn’s general invitation of the public. Notably, in holding that an occupant who had
stayed at a hotel for two or three weeks and paid weekly fees was
a guest, a court considered the occupant’s lack of prearrangements with the hotel critical.222
These common law factors for transiency no longer serve as
accurate proxies for distinguishing guests from tenants. First,
dwelling renters regulated by the FHA most likely solicit tenants
via public advertisement.223 A tenant, like a guest, would enter
the premises of a landlord previously unknown to him in accordance with a general invitation. Second, certain types of tenancy
arrangements do not prearrange a tenant’s duration of stay. An
example is tenancy at will, which enables either the landlord or
the tenant to terminate the rental agreement with little notice.224
This tenancy arrangement affords the tenant greater flexibility
in moving on from her rental property. Notably, beneficiaries of
this arrangement include tenants who move frequently and
therefore may bear significant similarities to travelers (the typical guests under common law) who stay at a particular location
for short periods of time.225
Just as dwelling rentals have acquired some of the characteristics of inns and hotels, inns and hotels have grown similar to
dwelling rentals. A stay at a hotel increasingly involves prearrangement, which may push the guest outside the traditional definition of a “guest” under the common law. This trend has resulted from the growing use of online hotel-reservation systems,
which enable guests to arrange the duration of their stay prior to

221

See SHERRY, supra note 209, at 143 (citing Hancock v. Rand, 94 N.Y. 1 (1883)).
See id. at 143–44 (first citing Holstein v. Phillips, 146 N.C. 366 (1907); and then
citing Pettit v. Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 600 (1912)).
223 Cf. 42 U.S.C.§ 3604(c) (prohibiting statements of discrimination in advertisements
for sale and rental of dwellings).
224 See The Investopedia Team, Tenancy-at-Will, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 22, 2021),
https://perma.cc/8F8U-QBLX.
225 See id. (noting that at-will tenancy is beneficial to tenants, “who may wish to have
the flexibility to change rental situations easily”).
222
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their arrival on the hotel premises.226 Further, recent reports have
shown that individuals across the country often resort to living in
hotels that “rent on a daily, weekly or monthly basis” after being
evicted from their rental properties.227 To these individuals, a
hotel room functions as their rental apartment. In some cities, as
many as 40% of a hotel’s guests may consist of such long-term
residents.228 Hotels’ increased service of tenants and guests who
have acquired some tenant characteristics229 (and vice versa for
dwelling rentals) suggest a growing similarity between hotelkeeping and the rental of dwellings. Consequently, the innkeeper’s
duty to accept all guests without discrimination should no longer
be limited to the hotelkeeping situation.
The growth of short-term rentals also supports extending the
innkeeper’s rule to apply to dwelling rentals. Since the last decade, sharing platforms like Airbnb have enabled homeowners to
rent their properties to short-term occupants.230 The short-term
rentals spurred by this sharing service not only provide a more
affordable alternative to hotels but also “displace[ ] long-term
housing in thousands of apartments.”231 This suggests that shortterm rentals share the characteristics of both types of business.
In light of the similarities between inns and short-term rentals, it makes sense to bring them under the coverage of the innkeeper rule. Meanwhile, the similarities between short-term rentals and traditional dwelling rentals, as implied by occupants’
abilities to use them interchangeably, suggests that the innkeeper’s rule should not be limited to one situation but not the
other. In addition, the same rationale supports extending the
226 See Eva Lacalle, How Does an Online Hotel Reservation System Work?, MEWS (Apr.
2, 2021), https://perma.cc/BS2N-HLD8.
227 See Britt Kennerly & Isadora Rangel, Invisible Homelessness: How Families End
Up Living at Hotels on the Space Coast, FLA. TODAY (Apr. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZV9JN9UM; see also Mariah Woelfel, Homeless Can Keep Staying at a Downtown Chicago Hotel
Through the Winter, WBEZCHICAGO (Nov. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/P4KE-YD38 (describing the city of Chicago’s rental of hotel rooms to tackle the problem of homelessness).
228 Cf. Kennerly & Rangel, supra note 227 (describing the proportion of long-term occupants of the River Palm Hotel along the Space Coast).
229 See generally Amy M. Campbell, Note, When a Hotel Is Your Home, Is There
Protection? — Baker v. Rushing, 15 CAMPBELL L. REV. 295 (1993) (discussing Baker v.
Rushing, 409 S.E.2d 108 (1991), a case where a state court found that hotel occupants who
had stayed for six years and had no residences elsewhere were tenants rather than guests
even though they lived in a hotel).
230 Allyson E. Gold, Community Consequences of Airbnb, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1577, 1584
(2019).
231 Id. at 1581 (quoting N.Y. STATE OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY 3
(2014)).
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innkeeper’s rule to apply to both short- and long-term rentals.
Both situations present significant problems concerning the landlord’s ability to discriminate during occupant selection.232 Therefore, extending the innkeeper’s rule to both rental scenarios provides a sensible strategy moving forward.
Extending the common law duty to accept all comers to the
rental of dwellings does not upset a landlord’s right to exclude or
a tenant’s expectation of privacy. Under the common law, innkeepers may exclude guests for reasons other than discrimination, including the availability of space, ability to pay, and safety
of existing occupants.233 For example, innkeepers may exclude
when their inns are full234—in other words, “when all the bed
chambers are occupied” and a potential guest has no right to demand to share a room with an existing occupant.235 Moreover, innkeepers do not have to accept potential guests who are incapable
of “paying a compensation suitable to the accommodation
provided”236 and can set prices to proactively limit their service to
individuals of a particular wealth status.237 Scholarship examining old common law cases also found that innkeepers had broad
discretion to exclude individuals of “objectionable character,” including brawlers, gangsters, mobsters, ex-convicts, or people “habitually picked up by the police for questioning,” whose presence
might disincentivize potential occupants from entering their establishments.238 Just as innkeepers retained powers to exclude
under common law, a landlord subject to the innkeeper’s rule
would retain discretion to reject potential renters for good reason;
this would allow landlords to keep members of the public from
intruding into properties that were already occupied by their
tenants.
232 See id. at 1597–1600; Justin Tanaka & David Lau, Essay, Airbnb in Paradise:
Updating Hawai’s Legal Approach Towards Racial Discrimination in the Sharing
Economy, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 435, 458–59 (2017).
233 The common law innkeeper’s ability to exclude potential guests in certain cases
despite the duty to serve all comers results from “consideration for the safety and comfort
of the patrons already in the hotel” and “the proprietor’s expectancy of compensation, and
the space limitations of the inn.” Comment, Innkeeper’s Right to Exclude or Eject Guests,
7 FORDHAM L. REV. 417, 419 (1938).
234 See SHERRY, supra note 209, at 78.
235 Innkeeper’s Right, supra note 233, at 421.
236 SHERRY, supra note 209, at 81 (quoting Thompson v. Lacy (1820), 106 Eng. Rep.
667 (K.B.)).
237 Innkeeper’s Right, supra note 233, at 424 (“[A] proprietor may fix the grade of his
inn so high as to exclude all but the wealthy.”).
238 SHERRY, supra note 209, at 79, 80 (first citing Markham v. Brown, 8 N.H. 523
(1837); and then citing Goodenow v. Travis, 3 Johns. 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808)).
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Analogizing between inns and rental dwellings would establish a new basis for understanding dwelling rentals as businesses
open to the public. Namely, they are as open to the public as hotelkeeping businesses. This analogy would completely transform
the common law understanding that only innkeeping, as a special
category of business, must serve all comers. This solution creates
a less significant impact on society than allowing landlords to racially discriminate against potential tenants. Extending the duty
to accept guests without discrimination to landlords does not alter
the protections that hotel guests receive under the innkeeper’s
rule.
C. Normative Rationales for Extending the Business-Open-tothe-Public Exception to Cover the FHA
In the previous sections, this Comment explored one method
of preventing the FHA from being disabled post–Cedar Point.
Recent scholarship has suggested other ways for the Court to
achieve the same outcome.
One pathway would allow the FHA to remain operative even
if it were found to be a per se taking. Specifically, because “Cedar
Point turned entirely on the discretion of the justices,”239 Bowie
envisions that the Court could simply choose to act moderately by
declaring that affected property owners only deserve nominal
compensation, like “one dollar per taking.”240 The problem with
this method, however, is that courts exercise full discretion over
whether to utilize it. As Bowie points out, a pro–property rights
Court could justify granting property owners large compensation
via selective citation of economic research, which would render
the FHA unenforceable.241
Further, constraining Cedar Point’s effects at the compensation stage would not resolve the problems that arise from a court
categorizing a statute as a taking. Holding that the FHA effects a
taking would set back current antidiscrimination movements.
The requirement that the government compensate landlords for
losing the right to discriminatorily select tenants is likely to normalize discrimination and segregation in society. By extension,
antidiscrimination efforts would become deviations from the
239 Bowie, supra note 8, at 198; see also Part I.C (discussing how Cedar Point loosely
interpreted precedents, even going as far as contradicting their legal reasonings, to find
support for its holding).
240 Bowie, supra note 8, at 198.
241 See id. at 199.
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norm. This, in turn, would generate a legal and psychological entitlement to discriminate, slowing efforts to achieve equality in
the housing market and in society more broadly.
The other pathway, which this Comment has followed, is to
prevent the FHA from effecting a per se taking in the first place.
In light of Cedar Point—where the Court created a broad holding
that threatens to swallow up numerous statutes and then carved
out several exceptions—the two clearest methods for exempting
the FHA are to argue (as this Comment did) that it is covered by
an enumerated exception, or to engineer a new exception specifically for the FHA and similar antidiscrimination laws. Between
these choices, folding the FHA into an existing exception is more
in line with the Court’s current view on individual property
rights.
In particular, the Cedar Point majority’s broad protection of
the individual’s property rights cuts against the possibility that a
new exception would be created. Cedar Point suggests that the
Roberts Court would likely consider a landowner’s property interests to outweigh other interests that are implicated by right-toaccess regulations. The FHA implicates three types of interests.
First, the government desires to address racial tension across the
country and protect individuals from discrimination. Second,
some landowners wish to exclude unwanted strangers on the basis of a protected category. Third, the FHA’s beneficiaries have an
interest in being able to freely select and negotiate for their future
residences. Loretto found that governmental interests, which
define the purpose of a regulation, do not factor into the per se
taking analysis. Likewise, Cedar Point implies that any thirdparty beneficiaries’ interests in the right-to-access laws matter
very little compared to the landowners’ interests in their property
rights. In rendering its decision, the Court prioritized the powerful employers’ property interests over the disenfranchised agricultural employees’ interests in combatting exploitation.242 This
means that the Court would likely feel disinclined to affirmatively
erode its protection of property rights to create another Cedar
Point exception.
Finding shelter for the FHA within the business-open-to-thepublic exception avoids the ideological issue generated by the
Court’s pro–property rights philosophy. Instead of asking courts
to erode individuals’ property rights via a new exception, this

242

Cf. The LPE Project, supra note 124.
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method maintains that Cedar Point does not protect landlords’
rights to rent to tenants on discriminatory bases. This position is
the most reconcilable with both the majority opinion’s language
and its embedded ideologies.
CONCLUSION
Cedar Point was a victory for individual property rights.
Departing from its prior jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
protected agricultural employers’ right to exclude over union
organizers’ and employees’ interests in unionization and collective bargaining. Specifically, the Court found a per se taking in a
regulation that granted a miniscule segment of the public a right
to temporarily enter private premises.
The Court’s alteration of the definition of per se takings was
substantial. No longer is this designation reserved for regulations
that limit a landowner’s right to exclude by authorizing a permanent and physical occupation of private property. Instead, the distinction between permanent and temporary occupation has all
but disappeared, leaving regulations that establish temporary
rights of access at risk of becoming per se takings.
Cedar Point’s holding poses a serious threat to our nation’s
antidiscrimination laws. A prime example is the FHA, which
takes away a landlord’s right to lawfully exclude minority members of the public from temporarily occupying the landlord’s property as tenants. Under Cedar Point’s definition, the FHA likely
amounts to a per se taking. Such a finding would be detrimental
to the FHA’s enforceability and capacity to promote equality in
the housing market.
This Comment presents one way to counteract Cedar Point’s
endangerment of the FHA. It takes a close look at Cedar Point’s
enumerated exceptions and recommends finding that the rental
situations regulated by the FHA fall under the business-open-tothe-public exception. This solution is compatible with the Court’s
and legislature’s views on rental situations, does not upset the
expectations of landlords and tenants, and accords with the takings framework and ideological stances of Cedar Point.

